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his article is a response to what Professor
Vázquez (2013) considers the “enemies” of
Positive Psychology (hereinafter PP). The label of
“enemy” is completely false. In fact, neither Pérez-Álvarez
(2012), nor any of the authors of this paper, are
“enemies” of anything. Another very different issue would
be if being critical were equivalent to being an “enemy”.
In this sense, the authors could indeed be considered
“enemies” of PP. It is true that Vázquez is interested in the
“good name of Psychology” (p.91). He rightly recognises
that “the reader does not deserve to be punished with
parasitic discussions” (p. 91). The authors of this paper
argue that psychology does not need either the deception
of linguistic happiness or the false unfulfilled promises of
psychological well-being. 
It is imperative to be critical in order to find a perspective
that does justice to PP. It must be a fair criticism, made
with intellectual honesty and based on an epistemology of
virtue. Thus, PP, as a new academic discipline, seems
dispensable, and its discourse, exhausted. Since its
theoretical and practical development in the late twentieth
century, it has generated unwavering adherence and
harsh criticism, wrongly understood at times. Abundant
examples of critical bibliography can be found both in
English (Binkley, 2014; Ehrenreich, 2009, Frawley,
2015; Ivtzan, Lomas, Hefferon, & Worth, 2016;
Kristjánsson, 2013; McDonald & Wearing, 2016) and in
Spanish (Cabanas & Huertas, 2014; Fernández-Ríos &
Novo, 2012; Pérez-Álvarez, 2013; and Piña, 2014).
From its content it is extracted that PP represents a
confusing, uncertain and repetitive field of research-
action.
This work is based on the theory of deceptive
manoeuvres in the reasoning of Eemeren and
Grosstendorstt (2003/2011), the use of the concept of
fallacy by Sternberg, Kaufman, and Grigorenko
(2008/2011), and the psychomythology of Lilienfeld,
Lynn, Ruscio, and Beyerstein (2009/2010). The concept
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of myth that is adopted herein refers to a series of
deceitful arguments about the theory and practice of PP.
These are based on a mistaken history of PP, a fuzzy
theoretical discourse, a dubious interpretation of the
empirical data, and a series of deceptive manoeuvres
regarding the discourse offered to the public. Thus, the
emotional narrative of PP is based on a moving magma
of tautological and repetitive statements. With these
considerations in mind, our aim is to expose a series of PP
myths that bestow it with a dubious scientific and social
usefulness. Specifically, we have established two broad
categories of myths. In the first, which deals with the
historical and epistemological aspects, the originality of
PP and its vision of the human being are questioned, and
the limitations of its discourse are evident, as well as its
lack of empirical foundation. In the second, focused on
the myths concerning the need for PP, the discussion
centres on the lack of ideological neutrality, its quest to
become universally valid, and the false predicament of
positive mental health; moreover, it is highlighted that it is
dispensable for psychological practice, and in order to
achieve happiness and social change. This work
concludes by presenting a number of minimum issues to
consider a critical future for PP.
HISTORICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL MYTHS ABOUT PP
Myth: PP is philosophically and anthropologically
original and recent
People have always had a need for a healthy and
hopeful justification for the daily process of living. PP is on
the one hand, a recycled version of “light” ideologies
about happiness; and, on the other, an eclectic invention
of the philosophies and anthropologies of the new age.
The new age brings a DIY system of pseudopsychological
beliefs and practices, as an alternative to goodness knows
what. It focuses on human beings themselves, and with a
holistic view of a supposed universal energy. It seems that
the traditional lifestyle has become toxic. Apparently it
contributes to developing human potential and overall
health. What and how it creates is almost irrelevant. PP in
the new age plays a psychological role for non-believers
and people who are disillusioned with the society in which
they have to live. Many positive psychologists have
overlooked the history of happiness, many others have
refused to critically reflect upon what they do with PP.
They have been led astray by the “gurus” of research
trends which, in this case, cloud the capacity for reflection
and obstruct constructive criticism. 
To consider PP as something new is to disregard the
history of philosophical and anthropological thought. In
this sense, many PP publications are deeply ahistorical.
They provide knowledge in terms of what the researcher
thinks they know, but can actually be utterly wrong. The
defenders of PP attempt to distort history to justify the
establishment of the foundations of a new discipline. They
exhibit a presenteeism which recognises, solely and
exclusively, the merit and value of the recent publications
in the psychology of positivity, and forget the long-term
history in philosophy and the anthropology of positive
emotions. However, PP represents largely an imitation of
what is already known. Therefore, the presenteeist and
ethnocentric history of PP is false or, at least, inaccurate.
Moreover, it is, on many occasions, the mere depiction of
the history of common sense regarding happiness, and
how to get it. An example is the theory of “the expansion
and construction of positive emotions” by Fredrickson
(2013) who postulates, simply, that the positive seeks the
positive. To demonstrate that the positive leads to the
positive, common sense and popular sayings will suffice. 
Myth: PP uses a unified and coherent discourse that
transcends the mere narration of positive emotions
The discourse of PP lacks consistency and uniformity,
and provides a narrative of positive affect. On the one
hand, it is full of travelling concepts (Bal, 2002) which,
like nomadic concepts, pass from one discourse to
another. The conceptual delimitation is distorted, and PP
becomes a narrative full of scattered concepts with
insecure and constantly changing semantics. In this
regard, Ahmed (2010) believes that the word happiness
is mobile and promiscuous. Thus, a hazy, uncertain and
ambiguous interdisciplinary discourse is constructed that
results in the absence of a unified field of action-research. 
On the other hand, the texts of PP feed off the simple
narratology of positive emotions, that is, a literature of
positive psychology. This discourse of positivity creates the
ideal social space for the penetration of a story of
linguistic happiness. Whether or not this story is based on
empirical data, it will always have a favourable audience.
It cannot be denied that PP is discursively appealing. As
is the narrative of happiness and positive emotions.
However, in its discourse and the interpretation made  of
the results of the research, linguistic uncertainty and
semantic games abound.
Consequently, one could argue that if the discursive
horizons of positivity are nomadic, PP becomes changing
and liquid; and even providing an elegant, friendly and
attractive linguistic happiness, its discourse does not shy
away from being redundant, circular, and ambiguous. PP
exhausts its own language, and is full of platitudes. 
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Myth: PP constitutes empirically based scientific
knowledge
The interpretation of the results of scientific research in
general, and PP, in particular, is a hermeneutical process,
and socially controlled. In PP, the interpretive hermeneutics
of the data are full of ideology, multiple meanings and
ambiguities. Thus, despite the enthusiasm that is seen in
some sectors about the possibilities offered by the
knowledge that emerges from the research in PP, Pérez-
Álvarez (2013) rightly considers that the empirically
substantiated truths produced by PP constitute “absolute
trivialities” and “scientific small change” (p. 219).
A number of ideas are available to reinforce the above
consideration. Firstly, an abundant circularity is seen in
the interpretation of results, and explanations are offered
for almost everything. In addition, on many occasions,
attempts are made to explain the obvious. Secondly,
there is the “projection of knowledge argument”
(Stanovich, 2002/2003, p. 190), according to which
supporters of PP project an interpretation of the data
favourable to their beliefs. Thirdly, for the explanation of
the dubious results, the perspective “on paradoxes” by
Hempel (1965/1968) is applied: “ paradoxical cases
must be considered confirmatory or positive” (p.55).
Consequently, when there are no clear results from PP
investigations, they must be interpreted in its favour.
Fourthly, and finally, there is the truth effect (Dechêne,
Stahl, Hansen & Wänke, 2010), which argues that the
repetition of an ambiguous statement or conclusion
increases the likelihood that it will be judged as true. In
short, too much unfounded speculation, interpretative
alchemy and linguistic secrecy is observed. PP is more
like a pseudoscience or an existential philosophy of the
new age than an empirically-based knowledge.
An added problem to this lack of empirical rigour, is
generated by the current mode of disseminating scientific
knowledge. The pressure of university policy leads to
publish in journals with impact, even when the articles
conclude the obvious. The priority is to publish even when
there is nothing relevant to say (Fernández-Ríos &
Rodríguez-Díaz, 2014). This is a form of what Buela-
Casal (2014) called pathological publication, which is a
disease in the construction and dissemination of
knowledge. As it could not be otherwise, in PP there also
abounds a pathological publication of works which
include irrelevant and repetitive information.
Myth: The conclusions derived from PP interventions are
clear
In addition to those mentioned in the previous myth,
intervention in PP suffers from much ideology and self-
fulfilling prophecy, if not bias, in order to demonstrate,
that is, put into practice a theory. Greater objectivity
and empirical basis is needed. In any case, if the
conceptual framework is unclear, the intervention
planning also becomes uncertain and therefore the
practice ends up leading to the same problems as the
theory. As a result, the conceptual fuzziness of the
theoretical discourse of PP is manifested in the results of
the intervention in the form of ambiguous and dubious
conclusions.
Thus, in the published literature, meta-analysis can be
found for almost any conclusion previously established
in the minds of the researchers. If someone wants to
reach conclusions favourable to PP, they will find
empirical evidence. If someone seeks the opposite, they
will also find it. For example, Chida and Steptoe (2008)
conclude that psychological well-being affects the
survival of healthy and sick individuals, in spite of the
“publication bias” (p.754). Boehm and Kubzansky
(2012) claim that psychological well-being is positively
associated with health behaviours, and negatively
associated with behavioural pathology. Sedlmeier et al.
(2012) declare that meditation has positive effects on
health, although it is difficult to establish the magnitude
of the effect size clearly. Zeidner, Matthews, and
Roberts (2012) consider that social well-being
correlates with emotional intelligence. Emotional
intelligence is nothing more than “old wine packaged in
shiny new containers” (p.22). Bolier et al. (2013) claim
that interventions of PP enhance people’s psychological
well-being with an effect size ranging from small to
moderate. The results are difficult to interpret, also due
to “publication bias” (p. 17). Cheney, Schlösser, Nash,
and Glover (2014) conclude that interventions from the
perspective of PP produce “invisible” internal changes
(p. 22). In addition, inadequate control groups and a
lack of randomisation of participants “limit the
conclusions” (p.23). Finally, Quoidbach, Mikolajczak,
and Gross (2015) conclude that positive emotions may
be favoured through visualising positive events,
optimising positive situations, paying attention to the
positive aspects of situations, and expressing and
sharing positive emotions.
In summary, explanations and conclusions of all kinds
are observed. A hodgepodge of interpretive hermeneutics
that suggests serious problems in synthesising empirically-
based information in PP. This is not because PP has
“enemies” but because it generates too many anxieties
about the outcome of the intervention.
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Myth: PP has a holistic view of the human being in their
life context
PP does not provide a comprehensive view of the human
being. It has selected a number of strengths, but has
forgotten many other important ones. For example, it has
overlooked the importance of nature or the ecological
niche and geographic psychology (Rentfrow, 2014). This
would enable us to speak of a geographical psychology
of happiness, which would contemplate the importance of
nature or life context as a restorative environment.
Furthermore, PP is characterised by an ethnocentric
cultural worldview. It forgets or, even worse, marginalises
the social, cultural and economic conditions of each
cultural tradition. Thus it imposes, sometimes implicitly, a
cultural imperialism, which is unfair, perverse and lacking
in research ethics. 
Myth: Despite psychometric evaluation, PP looks for
identified lives; i.e., personal biographies, not statistical
lives 
The lives identified are individually and personally real,
that is, they have a unique biographical narrative. In
contrast, we cannot put a face to the statistical lives of
average happiness, nor can we put a name, or any of the
other attributes of personal biographies. Unfortunately, PP
focuses on the latter. It is interested in large numbers of
happiness, and comparison between individuals, groups,
communities and societies. It is a serious error that PP
persists in the impersonal neopythagoreanism
quantification of statistical lives and overlooks the
biographical history of the people (Cohen, Daniels, &
Eyal, 2015; Schelling, 1968). The statistics of large
numbers, i.e., big data, create categories of individuals
and classify people, but do not understand them. In this
sense, PP manifests excessive pride in the use of
psychometrics, and the quantification of happiness.
However, two issues must be considered. Firstly, despite
the obsession with the reliability and validity of the
instruments, there are multiple problems of everyday
existence that are not psychometric issues but practical life
situations. Secondly, the overuse of quantitative aspects in
the search for an impossible existential objectivity may
generate a pathology of quantification.
MYTHS ABOUT THE NEED FOR PP TO ENHANCE
HAPPINESS AND PROMOTE SOCIAL CHANGE
Myth: PP is ideologically neutral and favours social
change
PP has never been ideologically neutral, nor has it
favoured social change. The consumption of information
about positive emotions favours a sentimental and
therapeutic culture. Thus, a political ideology of the
positive and self-help books is marketed, deceptively,
favouring a utopian and impossible struggle for self-
realisation. It is the ideology of the consumer society of the
positive. An emotional capitalism that establishes
disciplines and knowledge to rule lives, emotions, hopes
and expectations of well-being. An enormously lucrative
business. 
Thus, PP does not necessarily favour social change.
Rather, it is a tool of the psychological culture of the
capitalism of positivity to promote individualism, the
prevailing conservative ideology, and the happy
entertainment of the upper classes. It defends, following
Foucault (2004/2009), a biopolitics of positivity which
establishes regimes of truth for a policy of positive health.
Therefore a neoliberal discourse about happiness has
been constructed, which turns PP into a control instrument
of the psychological processes of happiness (Binkley,
2014). 
Therefore, PP acts as a discipline of power and politics
of truth that promotes a technology that instructs people in
what they have to do to be happy. In reality, they end up
imposing control and enforcement procedures in order to
be happy in a certain way. The society of happiness and
well-being indexes aims to provide citizens with pleasant
care in a cultural climate that infantilises them, and makes
them become dependent and docile. Thus, PP becomes a
political weapon of psychological and ideological control,
which does not provide liberating or emancipating
empirical knowledge.
Myth: A theory and practice of PP that is universally
uniform to all cultures is feasible
Culture is an inter-subjective representation of a number
of values, ideologies, lifestyles and beliefs that establish a
project of being-in-the-world. By simply being born into a
culture or socio-material context of existence, the human
being necessarily has a worldview. For any person, the
world is their mental representation, socially constructed.
Consequently, the concepts of happiness, subjective well-
being and positive emotion are relative. Each culture sets
up a single mode of thought in action and coping
strategies that make a universal PP impossible. PP is
culturally conditioned. What may be perceived in one
cultural system as happiness, in another, may not be. One
can even talk in some non-western cultural contexts, of a
certain “aversion to happiness”, as understood in the
cultures of the advanced capitalist countries (Joshanloo &
Weijers, 2014). Therefore, a PP is imposed, that should
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adopt a multiplicity of cultural perspectives; which implies
a relativistic approach to the theory and practice of PP. It
cannot and should not impose cultural imperialism
through the supposed science of happiness. A PP that
seeks nonexistent universal laws of happiness, becomes a
theoretical injustice, a practical impossibility, a betrayal
of the epistemology of virtue, and a lack of professional
honesty.
Myth: PP postulates a positive mental health that is
highly healthy
PP is not always healthy. Moreover, there is a serious
risk that its theory and practice result in a factory of
psychological distress. On the one hand, positive
psychologists do not promote, primarily, lifestyles
oriented to positive mental health. In fact, they propose
the classical model of deficit or vulnerability. It is in their
interests that the person experiences an existential
dissatisfaction, and problematises their daily subjective
well-being. This state of existential anxiety places the
person in the optimal conditions to consume the false
positivity that is being offered. Therefore, before
emphasising the positive, the fundamental issue for PP lies
in the dramatising and problematising the negative
aspects of the process of living. Thus, it behaves like the
other type of psychology to which it attempts to offer an
alternative, what is known as negative psychology
(hereinafter NP); that is, it restores a mindset of creating
psychological deficits in people, and establishing new
pathologies of reason and social aspects. PP supposedly
provides magic solutions to this anthropological,
psychological and sociological fatalism. However,
positive emotions existed prior to its discourse; the useful
aspects of existential adversities and positive emotions
have been known about since ancient times.
On the other hand, PP offers false hopes and, perhaps,
many times, generates more disillusionment than
happiness. The obsession with positive emotions, as well
as the tyranny of satisfactory self-realisation, may be
transformed into something pathological. When the
irrational need to be happy becomes an epidemic, PP
creates more social problems than it solves, to the point
that one could speak of a pathology caused by PP. One
example is the well-being syndrome (Cederström &
Spicer, 2015), which materialises in the obsession with
feeling good permanently.
Myth: PP is necessary for psychology professionals
For PP it seems that psychologists, before the emergence
of the positivity discourse, were historically misinformed,
misguided professionals and sadists who revelled in the
problems of human beings. However, psychology has
always been positive, as it has always tried to solve
problems. Health professionals have constantly focused
on helping to alleviate human suffering positively. The
quality of life and well-being of people can be enhanced
without knowing a thing about PP. For over a century,
psychologists have worked on many occasions with great
success without the explicit philosophy of PP. The only
thing necessary is to know the history of psychology, to
have a comprehensive knowledge of human beings and
their life context, and to carry out psychology work
ethically and appropriately. Over the years, health
professionals have not been so heartless that they thought
that humans only present problems. In short, PP is not a
new paradigm or a new social movement, nor is it a
genuine psychological theory. Therefore, it is
psychologically dispensable when one has an optimal
historical training, an open mind to the past, a
comprehensive reading of classical wisdom, and a good
dose of common sense.
Myth: PP is essential to enhance social happiness
PP is not intrinsically necessary in order for citizens to be
happier. The question of happiness, individual and social,
is as old as ideology, literature, religion, social medicine,
cultural anthropology and, of course, psychology. In fact,
the whole history of political ideologies, religions,
philosophical systems, and world views is a product of
humanity in order to be individually and collectively
happier. It doesn’t matter whether we speak of PP, or a
political ideology of happiness, pedagogy of happiness,
or ethics of happiness. What PP promises has been done
historically by other disciplines. The recent problem of
happiness is an ideologically constructed social invention
(Frawley, 2015). 
Moreover, when positivity experts reveal what citizens
must do to be happy, all too often they pervert the
psychological knowledge about positivity. Positive
psychologists seem to have a hidden wisdom or some
kind of miraculous elixir, apparently essential for human
happiness. However, this way of thinking makes PP a
psychological frustration and social disillusionment.
Therefore, PP may be irrelevant, if not harmful, to the
happiness of individuals, groups and communities.
FUTURE PROSPECTS: BEYOND PP
Considering all of the above, it seems appropriate to
question what to do with PP. Although it is highly complex
to glimpse into its future, there will certainly continue to
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appear new literature on the philosophy, anthropology
and sociology of happiness. In fact, it is observed that
currently research in many different disciplines has turned
towards happiness. The only relevant issue seems to be to
talk about happiness, well-being and self-help. If PP
focuses on the story of positive emotions, its future is
assured, but more should not be expected from a
psychological and scientific perspective. For this reason,
next we will refer to a number of minor issues on the one
hand, in order to try to build a PP that uses and
disseminates a precise, clear and useful research-action
discourse; and on the other hand, the issues are
necessary in order to consider a critical future for PP.
First, it seems appropriate to conceive the future of
critical PP based on the search for a solution of
compromise which gives up preconceived and
unchanging interpretive principles, and adopts a
constructive attitude. Without finding a common space of
dialogue, a sensible and responsible PP is impossible,
and it must not promise what it cannot achieve. Greater
integration is required in the discourse of general
psychology, and fragmentations between NP and PP
should be avoided. 
Second, one must take into account the history of
concepts or begriffigeschichte (Koselleck, 2004), which
implies a historical analysis of the concepts, words and
discourse used by PP. In this sense, PP describes and
interprets history taking ancient or classical concepts into
consideration, as if they maintained the same meaning
today. However, each concept used in the discourse of PP
(e.g., justice, happiness, etc.) has a multiplicity of
meanings that gradually adapt to the changing reality.
Consequently, the science of historical semantics helps us
to keep in mind the history of the concepts used in the
discourse of PP.
Third, it is becoming more complex to identify the
specific goal of psychology in general, and PP, in
particular. So PP needs to be more precise, less
ambiguous, and it must give up trying to cover everything.
The possession of the magic potion of happiness cannot
be attributed to PP, and it must admit that there is no
single truth. Positive psychologists cannot and should not
impose, in an imperialist way, a dogmatic and universal
truth. There are many truths in psychology, and
innumerable truths in PP.
Fourth, it should adopt the “principle of parsimony”
(Popper 1935/1985, p.136). Self-evident hypotheses
abound and there is too much circularity (ad exemplum,
subjective well-being correlates with perceived
happiness). The aim is to avoid complicating things when
they can be simple. Therefore, the rational use of the
theory and practice of PP should be encouraged, and
understandable, simple and useful explanations should be
sought; and, in turn, it should be attempted to avoid the
unnecessary plurality of concepts and conclusions that,
not infrequently, are mere platitudes and deceptive
manoeuvres in the pseudoscience of happiness. The
explanations of PP ooze romantic scientism, i.e.,
unreachable dreams for a simple scientific explanation of
complex phenomena (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2014).
Additionally, the excessive specialisation of PP language
should be controlled. Actually, it is an experimental
pseudo-philosophy of positive emotions. If this
specialisation is unchecked, PP will become a body of
knowledge, on the one hand, to enter the fraudulent
business of self-help; and, on the other, to be confused
with a new age philosophy of happiness. 
Fifth, there is the matter of learning from what is known.
It is necessary to expand the training of future
psychologists in the history of the philosophy,
anthropology and sociology of happiness. Thus, it could
be shown that the texts of the struggle of human beings to
be happy, historically speaking, have nothing to do with
what is known as PP. From an in-depth reading of the
Greek and Roman classics, intellectual humility and
psychological relativism are acquired. Furthermore, the
field of knowledge should be expanded with divergent
readings. Always reading the same things is harmful to
the intellectual health of the researcher and practitioner.
PP has kept itself to itself too much, and persists in
repeating content. Cronbach (1975) was right when he
argued that psychologists would be better prepared if
they read “more broadly about history, ethnology and the
centuries of humanist writings on man and society”
(p.125).
Sixth, the knowledge of two exciting fields of research
must be incorporated and integrated. On the one hand,
that extracted from the study of centenarians (Bishop,
Martin, MacDonald, & Poon, 2010; Friedman, 2011;
Vaillant, 2011; Whitbourne, 2010). And, on the other
hand, consideration of the results of longitudinal work on
invulnerability and resilience (Block, 1971; Elder, 1999;
Masten, 2014; Werner & Smith, 2001). This would help
to promote the development of positive emotions and
quality of life. 
Seventh, it is essential to consider the person as a whole,
as it was done hundreds and hundreds of years ago,
(Kashdan & Biswas-Diener, 2014); to be aware of the
social, cultural and economic conditions of each culture;
and to adopt a relativistic approach in the theoretical
LUIS FERNÁNDEZ-RÍOS AND MANUEL VILARIÑO 
139
A r t i c l e s
discourse and professional practice. PP should not make
pathologies out of normality, nor should it problematise
everyday emotions in the process of living, or engender
false hopes that result in higher levels of suffering and
disappointment. In this sense, the best that all
psychologists, positive and negative or however they want
to be called, can do, is to return to the old statement of
Hippocrates (1989), about the ultimate goal of all help, in
this case psychological, which would be to “help or at
least cause no harm” (I, 2nd constitution, 11).
Eighth, PP should attach greater importance to the
following three aspects. Firstly, there are the risk factors
that produce social pain, such as class struggle, social
injustice, and the inequality of social power (Borsook &
MacDonald, 2013) and social status (Cheng, Tracy &
Anderson, 2014). Secondly, we highlight the sociological
and anthropological research on post-material values,
democratisation processes, individual capacity for
freedom of choice, sense of personal fulfilment, personal
flourishing, life satisfaction, empowerment, interpersonal
trust, and individual autonomy (Diener, Inglehart, & Tay,
2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010). And thirdly, we should
enhance the role of nature, the natural environment, as
restorative resources to build health and quality of life in
general, and positive mental health, in particular (Beute &
de Kort, 2014; Blatt, 2014; Stokols, Perez Lejano & Hipp,
2013; Van de Vliert, 2013). Therefore, we must move
beyond the current situation of PP. There are more
strengths than are established by the evaluation of
positive mental health.
Finally, in ninth place, one must keep in mind that what
PP does could be done by the psychology of the good life
(Bishop, 2015), passion (Vallerand, 2015), moral
personality (Kristjánsson, 2013), psychological capital
(Luthans, Youssef-Morgan, & Avolio, 2015), the science
of personality and the art of well-being (Little, 2014), or
even what has been called experimental philosophy
(Lombrozo, Knobe & Nichols, 2014) of happiness and
well-being. There is nothing in PP that cannot be done by
another discipline that is already available (e.g., cultural
anthropology, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, etc.). 
CONCLUSIONS
The supposed theoretical and practical success of PP is
relatively disappointing. Its theoretical discourse lacks
originality, and the research findings do not have enough
empirical foundation. Thus, the affective narratology of PP
is a repetitive knowledge, full of common sense and
unwritten philosophy from popular proverbs. In addition,
PP claims but does not achieve scientific thoroughness,
experimental rigour, and an ethical and ideologically
neutral interpretation of the data. PP is not more original,
and will not increase its empirical foundation, by
publishing more of the same. 
It is not clear that PP has been especially useful for
academic psychology, and the confused social role of the
psychologist. The theory and practice of PP have been
tried, but the available evidence yields scientific and
psychological results of little success. It is true that it
provides an attractive language, one could say, a
linguistic happiness, but almost nothing else. Its tenets end
up being part of the fragmented psychological
knowledge, like those of humanistic, phenomenological
and existential psychology.
Possibly, this situation is nothing more than an example
of the current disorientation of psychology itself in
general. The aim of psychology is changing, liquid, and
fluctuating depending on the interests of each historical
moment. Psychologists would be mistaken if they let
themselves be captivated uncritically by an insubstantial
PP, full of tricks to deceive people; i.e., misleading
manoeuvres and pseudoscience. PP without constructive
criticism becomes a dead psychology, without hope and
a producer of theoretical and empirical disenchantment.
If this is not fighting for the good name of psychology, the
real problem is within the defenders of the orthodoxy of
positivity. Unfortunately, it does not seem productive to
persist in the debate, when there is no will for consensus
or agreement. However, denying the criticism or
neglecting it generates the propitious environment for
widespread scepticism about the theoretical and practical
use of PP, and consequently, it is the best incentive in
order to end up considering it unnecessary and
dispensable.
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